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Abstract
This paper aims to study maturity models and how they can benefit organisations by developing a maturity
model framework for IT security. The first part of the paper includes a discussion of maturity models and how
they are applicable to the IT Security process and sets out the benefits of a maturity model approach to an
organisation. The second part discusses examples of different maturity levels for different processes involved in
the IT Security process. The paper concludes by comparing different maturity models in IT
Security/Governance.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper uses an approach based on Maturity Models to create a framework to address the important issues of
security and risk management. In our opinion, maturity models provides a structured approach to an issue like IT
Security, which is continuously evolving. The paper firstly considers the history of maturity models and how
they are applicable to IT Security. While maturity models themselves are not new, implementing a continuous
improvement model for IT security presents a different set of problems. Next, an approach to maturity Models is
suggested, followed by a discussion of how such an approach would be useful for organisations requiring a
more continuous and strategic risk management.

HISTORY OF PROCESS MATURITY FRAMEWORK
The original concept for a process maturity framework was developed by Watts Humphrey and his colleagues at
IBM in the early 1980s. In his 27 years at IBM, Humphrey noticed that the quality of a software product was
directly related to the quality of the process used to develop it. Having observed the success of total quality
management in other parts of industry, Humphrey wanted to install a Shewart-Deming improvement cycle
(Plan-Do-Check-Act) into a software organisation as a way to continually improve its development processes
(Deming 1986). Humphrey’s unique insight was that organisations had to eliminate implementation problems in
a specific order if they were to create an environment that supported continuous improvement guided by
Deming’s principles (Humphrey 1988).
The staged structure that underlies the maturity framework was first elaborated by Crosby (1979). Crosby’s
quality management maturity grid describes five evolutionary stages in adopting quality practices in an
organisation: the organisation would become aware of the new practice, learn more about it, try it in a pilot
implementation, deploy it across the organisation, and achieve mastery in its use. This framework was adapted
to the software process by Ron Radice and his colleagues working under the direction of Humphrey at IBM
(Radice et al. 1985).
However, Humphrey realized organisations were not succeeding in long-term adoption of improved software
development practices when they applied this maturity framework to individual practices or technologies.
Humphrey identified serious impediments to long-term adoption that had to be eliminated if improved practices
were to thrive in an organisation. Since many of these problems were deeply ingrained in an organisation’s
culture, he realized an approach was needed that addressed the organisation, not just its individual processes.
Consequently, he designed the process maturity framework to enable an organisation to achieve a state of
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continuous process improvement via five stages, which became the main inspiration of modern day maturity
models (Humphrey 1995).
On the information security front, early management techniques were in the form of a checklist-standard-based
methodology securing software or information systems (Baskerville 1988). Even though checklists are no longer
a hot topic in the contemporary information security industry, their cognate method – security management
standards are increasingly getting more focus (Rasmussen 2000). Both checklists and management standards
offer a ready-made generic catalogue of controls (Baskerville et al. 2002) and other protection means, which
have been documented through the culmination of years of experiences of IS security practitioners. These
standards define the set of evidence, sufficient for different ratings under the security criteria to define the
‘assurance requirements’ (Wichers et al. 1994).
Following ideas and developments in the field of software engineering, a few information security management
practitioners started to apply principles of maturity models to information systems security (Ferraialo et al.
1993). In fact, the major difference between information security maturity criteria and checklist-management
standards is the concept of ‘maturity levels’ with the emphasis on learning and improving from past experience.
As Siponen (2002) puts it, “any information security checklist or management standard can be turned into a
maturity criterion simply by dividing the checklist or management standard into maturity levels”. However,
organisations are starting to understand that compliance with security guidelines by completing a checklist with
all ‘Yes’ marked, does not mean that they are ‘completely secure’ (WISSSR 2001). Jelen et al. (1998, p1)
believe that “it is becoming increasingly difficult to gain and communicate assurance. As the level of
interconnection and complexity in products and systems increases, the amount of information required to justify
even the simplest claims grows quickly. Simple lists of evidence requirements are not adequate to represent the
information required to represent assurance.”
Organisations need to constantly update themselves regarding new threats and vulnerabilities, while at the same
time be more efficient by learning from the past. Thus, having ‘secured’ the current set of problems,
organisations should incrementally secure emerging issues, effectively building on the security process.
Maturity models advocate such a continuous improvement framework compared with a process standard
comprising of best practices. The model integrates improved practices into a staged process that enables an
organisation, (through a series of cultural transformations, each of which supports the development of more
sophisticated and mature development processes) to provide a continuous basis for the risk management process.
With this background, the paper proposes a new approach to implementing IT Security using a continuous
improvement model. The new approach was designed by conducting a critical comparative analysis of different
IT security management maturity models existing in literature - refer Appendix 1.

THE FRAMEWORK
Maturity models for controls over IT processes consist of developing a method of scoring so that an organisation
can grade itself from a non-existent level of controls to efficiently managing its processes. The model provides
the stages through which processes progress as they are defined, implemented and improved. The framework
provides a guide for selecting process improvement strategies by determining the current capabilities of specific
processes and identifying the issues most critical to process improvement within a particular domain. A maturity
model takes the form of a reference model to be used as a guide for developing and improving a mature and
defined process to achieve certain goals.
The maturity process is best understood if the measurement process is associated in terms of a ‘scale’ (Jelen et
al. 1998). This scale could employ numeric or qualitative values, or alternately it could be absolute or relative.
For example, one might define ‘security need’ as limiting annual loss expectancy from some cause to less than
$100,000, or as restricting the extent of data corrupted by a virus to an amount no greater than that from user
error. However, whether our statement of need is expressed in absolute (first example) or in relative terms (latter
example), it ultimately requires a means and a scale of measurement. Determining whether or not virus-caused
data corruption exceeds that from user error presumes some way of measuring both. Once a measurement scale
is selected, the ‘security need’ (goal) can be expressed as a threshold value on that scale and a measurement of
the actual level can be made. A comparison of the two values will provide a judgement of the present situation.
Whether the security goal is satisfied will depend upon the overall context which takes into account all the
parameters involved in defining that goal. The use of maturity models greatly simplifies this process by
providing a pragmatic and structured approach for measuring how well developed the processes are against a
consistent and easy-to-understand scale.
The developmental nature of a maturity model means that process maturation is cumulative. Lower stage
processes provide the foundation for upper stage processes. As additional critical processes are introduced into
the organisation and implemented, the organisation attains greater process capabilities and the ability to achieve
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higher level goals. The maturity progression also means that as the organisation incorporates additional
processes at each successive stage of maturity, previously implemented lower stage critical processes must be
maintained.
The maturity framework assumes that each practice has a risk to its successful adoption that is directly related to
the maturity of the organisation’s existing base of practices. One important premise of the model is that
sophisticated practices should not be attempted until the foundation of practices required to support them has
been implemented. Thus, the practices at each level of maturity prepare the organisation for adopting practices at
the next level. This staging of process maturity levels is unique in the organisational change literature and
provides much of the framework’s power for improving organisations.

THE NEW APPROACH
Today’s systems, and the enterprises in which they reside, are so complex that even the most capable risk
measurement tools are unlikely to yield risk values that are much better than rough indications of relative risk –
which in most cases is often quite good enough. The problem is that the value of risk, whatever it turns out to
be, is likely to be surrounded by a fairly large but unknown amount of uncertainty. This can create a dilemma
for the decision-maker who must then decide whether to invest in further safeguards, which will undoubtedly
reduce the overall risk but could be both expensive and unnecessary, or to collect more evidence to reduce the
amount of uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of the assurance process (Berinato 2002).
As cited above, there exists many security management guidelines in the market today. In one way or the other,
any security guideline will acknowledge the need for security awareness among the employees and advocate
appropriate education and training for all users and administrators. Broad level statements like these, while easy
to formulate, can be ambiguous. Does the term ‘awareness’ refer to being aware of something (security), or
refer to a state of affairs where employees are fully committed to the security policy. That is, it is very easy to
measure the numbers of trained individuals; but measuring the effectiveness of the training or the
appropriateness of training materials is extremely difficult.
Such ambiguity results in ‘reference-only’ practices that do not provide any guidance on how management can
know with confidence that employees are aware of, or committed to, security policies and procedures adopted
by the organisation. The problem is therefore, that unless one has a way to specify security needs in some
measurable way, management cannot say with confidence with the security needs have been satisfied. Williams
et al. (1998, p1) reminds us that “the whole security paradigm revolves around determining what ‘security
needs’ are, whether or not they have been ‘satisfied’, and how to determine ‘confidence’ that we are fulfilling
the security needs (goals)”.
With this viewpoint, we hypothesise that organisational maturity may be broken down into three broad
categories(refer Figure 1):
1.

Processes – activities which define the information system engineering practices, which include both
management as well as technical processes.

2.

Assurance – activities which give or inspire confidence in the whole process.

3.

Metrics – indicators which provide qualitative as well as quantitative information related to the above
activities.

Figure 1: The three-dimension framework to organisational maturity
To elaborate, processes are the activities performed directly to ‘secure’ the organisations and its related
functions. This can range from management activities such as conducting a Threats-Vulnerability Analysis
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(TVA) to technical security (e.g. installing a firewall). The second dimension of assurance provides the basis
for confidence that the security measures (technical, management or operational) work as intended to protect the
system and the information it processes. An example of such assurance can be provided by say complying to the
ISO 17799 standard. Stoneburner (2001, p3) advises that “Assurance provides a check that the security
objectives of the organisation (e.g. integrity of transaction, availability of resources, confidentiality of
information) have been addressed by a specific implementation when:
•

required functionality is present and correctly implemented,

•

there is sufficient protection against unintentional errors (by users or software), and

•

there is sufficient resistance to intentional penetration or by-pass”.

But on it own, assurance only provides baseline confidence in the security process. It is not enough unless the
organisation knows the performance level of the different processes and the related controls. This gap is filled
by the third dimension. Metrics provides the necessary measurement step to the assurance process, measuring
the efficiency, effectiveness and the impact of the security process. This in turn gives the organisation valuable
knowledge to better the security process, which forms the basis of the continuous improvement paradigm.
A critical feature of the view presented above is that the three different dimensions complement each other and
the overall organisational maturity is a cumulation of the other dimensions. Keeping these dimensions separate
helps to establish a clear distinction between them and thus reduces the confusion caused by any overlapping of
their meanings. For example, confusing the assurance dimension with security processes (practices) and metrics
dimension makes it very easy to miss interesting cases where the three dimensions lead to conflicting
conclusions.
To illustrate, consider an Anti-Virus (AV) system which is installed on the corporate server to curb the
increasing number of virus incidents attacking the organisation. Now if this organisation is audited according to
say the ISO 17799 standard on Information Security Management (ISO17799 2000) – the satisfaction of the
control statement Section 4.6.3 on malicious software from the guideline, ‘Detection and prevention controls to
protect against malicious software shall be implemented’ will technically comply with the requirement that the
organisation should provide suitable controls to protect the integrity of software and information. But is the
organisation confident that the goal behind installing the AV system is fully satisfied? It is unclear whether the
AV system achieves the said objective comprehensively since there is no effective measurement to give us the
degree of success or confidence. To continue the example, consider the case where after installing the AV
systems there is a reduction in the number of virus incidents. Unless there is a well-defined system of metrics
associated with the AV system, there is no guarantee that the reduction of incidents is due to the AV system - it
could be the case that coincidentally the number of virus attacks decreased. Now consider the case where the
number of incidents increases. In this case, management will be discouraged that the controls are not working
and in spite of investing in technology they are not getting the results. It is technical requirement that the success
of the AV system will depend on the administrator or the user updating the virus profiles on a regular basis. If
this task is not performed, the AV system is not going to be effective. The point being stressed here is that a
narrow focus on only the process (installing the AV system) and its related goal (reducing the number of
incidents) do not provide the complete picture. A broader viewpoint is required in terms of metrics – that is how
many viruses are hitting the AV system, how many were detected (and stopped), how many were not detected,
why were these not detected. And finally assurance related to whether the goals are being defined properly,
whether the metrics are answering these goals, is there ‘evidence’ in terms of demonstrated practice to
substantiate the arguments. Without the complete picture, it will be difficult to attribute success or failure to any
process.
In short, the three dimensions – processes, assurance and measurement alone do not provide the success
associated with out goals. The three processes while independent provide a basis of feedback to the other,
forming a balance of activities which in turn provides for improvement. At the same, these three dimensions
complement each other by providing the necessary questions/ arguments which will need to be answered (via
evidence) to fully achieve our goals with the highest degree of confidence.

WHY MEASURE
We measure because we need to know about an attribute or characteristic of something that is important to us. In
other words, measurements provide a single-point-in-time view of specific, discrete factors which can be
alternately related to the process of counting. A metric on the other hand is a vehicle for understanding, by
providing a standard unit to be used as a basis for comparison among like items or characteristics to enable
decision making. In the same way, control metrics enable organisations to assess their process capabilities that
are needed for understanding and evaluating the development and maintenance processes (Pfleeger 1995).
Metrics are derived by comparing to a predetermined baseline or to two or more measurements taken over time.
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An information security metric is formally defined as – a value, selected from a partially ordered set by some
assessment process, that represents an security-related quality of some object of concern. It provides, or is used
to create, a description, prediction, or comparison, with some degree of confidence (WISSSR 2001). Vaughn
(2001, p3) expresses his view that “Security metrics focus on the actions (and results of those actions) that
organisations take to reduce and manage the risks of loss of reputation, theft of information or money, and
business discontinuities that arise when security defences are breached”.
One way that metrics promote understanding is by making aspects of development or maintenance more visible.
This enables us to see into the ways in which processes, products, resources, methods, and technologies relate to
one another. In addition, metrics allow participants in the process to define a baseline for understanding the
nature and impact of proposed changes. Aided by metrics, we can answer questions not only about measuring
process improvement, but also justifying security expenditures, monitoring and objectively documenting the
organisation’s security posture, discovering areas needing correction, and establishing security goals (Kormos et
al. 1999). Finally, metrics allow both managers and developers to monitor the effects of activities and changes
on all aspects of development, so that action can be taken as early as possible to control the final outcome should
actual measurements differ significantly from plans.
Thus, measurement is useful for:
•

visibility and understanding (e.g. business value gained or lost from the security related activity);

•

establishing a baseline for improvement (e.g. understanding the level of implementation of its own
security standards, policies, and procedures); and

•

planning, monitoring and controlling products, processes and resources (e.g. determining the
effectiveness of the standards in protecting the enterprise, based on the results of their implementation
(Pfleegar 1995), (Bartol 2001).

Although a measurement program is an essential part of any development program, it is useful only in the larger
context of assessment and improvement. Choosing metrics, collecting data, analysing the results, and taking
appropriate action require time and resources; these activities make sense only if they are directed at specific
improvement goals. Thus the maturity framework is designed for application to practices that contribute directly
to the business performance of an organisation. Implementing a value-generating measurement program requires
that attention be given to the proper mapping of some identifiable organisational goal onto the measurement
program, and a translation back of measurement results to organisational actions (Niessink et al. 2001).
Realising this, the process maturity framework is used to ensure that what needs to be measured is visible in the
process, which in turn helps management understand the relationships among the processes, metrics and the
goals to determine the key opportunities for immediate improvements (Pfleeger 1995).

CONTINUOUS LEARNING AND IMPROVEMENT
Some processes are more mature than others, in that some processes are open and easily controlled, whereas
others are arcane and dependent on a small set of process managers. A key discriminator among process
maturity levels is the amount of visibility managers have into the overall process engineering and control
process. At the lowest level of maturity, the process is not well understood at all; as maturity increases, the
process is better understood and therefore better defined.
According to Basili and Rombach, “… (I)mprovement is only possible if we
a) understand what the current status of our environment is
b) state precise improvement goals for the particular project and quantify them for the purpose of control
c) choose the appropriate process execution models, methods, and tools in order to achieve these
improvement goals, execute and monitor the project performance thoroughly
d) provide a feedback mechanism – analyse the data to evaluate the current practices, record the
findings, determine problems, investigate alternate strategies or solution and finally make
recommendations for improvements.” ((Basili et al. 1988, p 761)
Maturity models can provide such a framework for the characterisation, planning, construction, analysis,
learning and feedback tasks. The key is to provide a systematic approach for setting project goals (tailored to the
specific needs of an organisation) and defining them in an operational and tractable way. Goals are then refined
into a set of success factors, the success of which will depend on a set of metrics for the different processes. And
to complete the framework, ‘evidence’ to prove that the goals have been successfully met can provide the
confidence or assurance factor. This whole process can be practiced on a cumulative basis so that the
organisation is continuously learning and improving as shown in Table 1.
The critical element being stressed in the above discussion is the use of metrics in a maturity models framework.
The process of defining goals, success factors or providing evidence each involves metrics. Maturity models
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which advocate metrics as part of their process will differentiate from conventional security management
guidelines which indirectly insist only on the use of existing and well-known methods and practices.
Information systems security today not only involves technical and business level considerations but also social
as well as environmental issues, which are highly unpredictable. Security managers will therefore have to
constantly find new ways to deal with unpredictable risks since a general prescriptive model will not suffice to
deal with new threats in the market. By defining metrics, for example critical success factors for the processes
which are of concern to the organisation, the security manager can then track these in time to find out exactly
how the processes are performing and depending on the outputs the manager can take suitable steps which will
lead to a more secure system. Maturity models can therefore encourage ‘innovation’ in trying to achieve the
goals set by the organisation depending on its culture and environment as compared to just satisfying an all
purpose security guideline which only prescribe broad based criteria2.
1. Initial

2. Repeatable

3. Defined

4. Managed

5. Optimising

Process

Ad hoc approach to
process and practice

Processes follow a
regular pattern

Practices are defined,
standardised and
documented

Internal best
practices are applied

Assurance

No review or audit
performed

Monitoring only in
critical areas of
concern

Security compliance
audit using industry
baseline standards

Measuremen
t

No defined metrics

Basic process related
security metrics
established

Metrics established
with defined goals are
analysed for feedback
to improve processes.

Comprehensive Risk
Management
involving both
technical and
business managers
Metrics designed
with business focus
(e.g. use of Balanced
Score Cards)

Best external
practices performed
through industry
feedback and
analysis
Organisation
regularly participates
in industry
benchmarking
Balanced Scorecards
techniques and other
scoring tools used
extensively to
provide continuous
assurance and
optimise processes.

Table 1: Continuous improvement based on the 3 dimensions

BENCHMARKING
The advantage of a maturity model approach is that it is relatively easy for management to place themselves on a
scale and appreciate what is involved if they need to improve performance. Because they are management
processes, increased maturity and capability is also synonymous with increased risk management and increased
efficiency. In an age of increasing electronic business and technology dependence, organisations will have to
demonstrably attain increasing levels of security and control. Every organisation must understand its own
performance and must measure its progress. Organisations need to be able to determine the level of adherence to
the control objectives either through a quick self-assessment (Kormos, 1999) or as a reference in conjunction
with an independent review.
Management may wish to put in context any of these assessments, by comparison to the industry and
environment they are in. Such comparisons can provide a strategic reference point for an organisation to
improve security and control, which in turn could also consist of looking at emerging international standards and
best-in-class practices. The emerging practices of today may then become the expected level of performance of
tomorrow and are therefore useful for planning where an organisation wants to be over time. Benchmarking and
measuring progress against peers and the enterprise strategy is one way of achieving a competitive level of IT
security and control.
To satisfy this need, the IT Governance Institute3 in collaboration with Information Systems Audit
Association (ISACA) has put forward an open standard called COBIT (Control Objectives for
Technology), which deals with IT Security as a part of the IT Governance control objectives. As
management guidelines, COBIT provides a generic maturity model (seeFigure 2) with an
measurement scale – based on a rating of ‘0’ through ‘5’ (COBIT-MG 2000).

and Control
Information
a part of its
incremental

While scoring organisations on their maturity levels through a benchmarking process can benefit organisations
by understanding the ‘state of play’ – without proper understanding and implementing controls, organisations
can overrate their level of maturity as good maturity ratings could result in good publicity and an increase in
business competence (Bollinger et al. 1991). While the study concentrated on software maturity models, the
2

The intention here is not to say that maturity models should replace information security management guidelines. Information security
guidelines are definitely needed as a baseline of minimum criteria from which maturity models can build on depending on the needs of the
organisation. They also provide a good starting point for organisations wanting to ‘secure’ themselves quickly.
3
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suggested countermeasures to deal with this problem [like including conducting online empirical evaluations
(not just paper-based), requiring two sources of confirmation, and choosing a representative evaluation team] are
also applicable to IS security maturity models as well. These countermeasures are direct examples of the
assurance dimension. However, O’Connell et al. (2000) study revealed that these proposed cures in isolation did
not totally remove the problem of distorting the truth. A crucial aim of setting up information security maturity
criteria is to assist other organisations, third parties, business partners, etc. to ensure that organisations which
they deal with have a certain level of information security. Unless there is a focus on demonstrated practice and
performance evaluation, real improvement will be difficult (Siponen 2002). For this reason CobiT advocates the
use of business oriented metrics like Critical Success Factors, Key Performance Indicators, Key Goal Indicators
to look at the bigger picture, that is to measure the different processes and how they perform in terms of not only
the technical needs but also in terms of the business goals (COBIT-MG 2000).

Figure 2: The CobiTgeneric maturity model (Source: COBIT Management Guidelines, ISACF)
Maturity models with such an approach will help professionals explain to managers where IT management
shortcomings exist and set targets for where they need to be by comparing their organisation’s control practices
to best practice examples. The right maturity level will be influenced by the enterprise’s business objectives and
operating environment. Specifically, the level of control maturity will depend on the enterprise’s dependence on
IT, the technology sophistication and, most importantly, the value of its information.

CONCLUSION
The importance of information security is paramount in today’s uncertain environment. While the issue of
information security management is not new, organisations are facing a tough proposition of securing
themselves in the constantly increasing risk environment. To help organisations, many guidelines have been
published in the past – but these guidelines are proving to be limited in their approach due to their static nature,
as compliance to the guidelines are basically at a point-in-time. Organisations need more than this to address
risk management on a more continuous basis. This paper has discussed a maturity model to implement a
‘culture of security’ (OECD 2002) within organisations on a continuous basis over the long term.
As highlighted in the paper, maturity models are not new and have been successfully implemented in
organisations developing software with very good results. If implemented correctly, similar benefits are
possible for organisations wishing to ‘secure’ themselves. The main focus of this paper has been on the
implementation of maturity models. The approach discussed essentially combines the benefits and advantages of
guidelines with a metrics driven approach to define a continuous model for improvement. While such an
approach has been implicitly followed by most maturity models in the market, this paper highlights the
advantage of distinguishing the issues of processes, assurance on the controls and metrics for feedback, analysis
and decision making. This distinction helps to understand maturity models better and make their implementation
easier – providing organisations with a roadmap to strategically deal with risk and security. Our framework also
provides a springboard for further research.
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Processes

Assurance

Arguments grouped under an
incremental model consisting of 5
stages:
I.
Uncertainty
II. Awakening
Stacey, T.R. (1996)
III. Enlightenment
‘Information security
IV. Wisdom
program maturity grid’,
V. Benevolence
Information Systems
Each of the above stages, there is a
Security, Vol. 5 No. 2.
description of different criteria
applicable across the process domains.
In addition, the model describes the
requirements to be satisfied for going
from a lower stage to a higher one.
The framework places low emphasis on
‘evidence’ requirements to substantiate
the claims that the criteria has been
satisfied.
The framework prescribes a metrics
The framework does NOT place much
Decision Support
driven incremental approach to security. importance on assurance except at the
Metrics Framework
Only examples of different aspects of
later stages. E.g. compliance and
(Ralph Leighton)
IT security from a technical perspective verification is only considered at Stage
Leighton, R. (2001)
III.
Decision Support Metrics (e.g. Vulnerability assessment,
Framework, Proceedings Penetration testing) are discussed
throughout the framework.
The framework does not describe any
of the ‘Workshop on
criteria statements to judge the
Information Security
successful achievement of a particular
System Scoring and
level.

Information security
program maturity grid
(Timothy Stacey)

Security is divided into 5 broad level
process domains:
• Mgmt understanding and attitude
• Security organisation status
• Incident Handling
• Security Economics
• Security Improvement Actions

Ranking’ (Security
Metrics.), 21-23 May.

IT security divided into 7 broad level
Gartner’s Security
Process Maturity Model domains (management as well as
technical) with each domain consisting
(Gartner Research)

Mien, Alain Dang Van
(2001) The Gartner
Security Process
Maturity Model, Gartner
research note DF-126680, 13th March

of the different sub-areas of focus:
• Business Perception
• Security Budget (organisation)
• Security Budget Spending (What
the money spent on)
• Technologies and Tools
implemented
• Security Organisations
• Transaction Incident Management
• Potential Difficulties

Criteria for assurance for the different
process domains are grouped into 4
phases. These are developed on the
basis of “mirroring the rise of human
civilization from primitive cultures to
complex societies”.
I. Hunter-Gatherer
II. Feudal
III. Renaissance
IV. Industrial
Each of the above phases have brief
statements, which describe the typical
maturity of the enterprise security
found at that level.
The framework does not describe any
‘evidence’ requirements to substantiate
the criteria at each level.

Metrics
While there were NO pre-defined
metrics applicable across the
process domains associated with
the model, implicit financial
measures like ‘Prevention Costs’
& ‘Loss’ amounts (under Security
Economics domain) have been
advocated at the different
incremental stages to track the
cost (success) of the security
program.

A 5 phased metrics driven
approach to security is advocated
with each phase presenting unique
requirements for the establishment
of metrics:
I.
Quick-fix
II. Architectural
III. Compliance
IV. Adjustment
V.
Testing
In the view of the author, “each of
the phases produces measurable
results that immediately and
continuously benefit the
organisation and that establish a
foundation for the next step.”
NO pre-defined metrics are
described by the model, applicable
across all process domains. Two
of the process domains focus on
security budget and budget
spending, which tracks the costs
and the allocations of financial
resources by the organisation.
Emphasis on measurement is also
briefly mentioned at phase IV
(Industrial) for the Business
Perception process domain e.g.
“Transaction security measured in
real-time”
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An incremental maturity model (5
levels) describes the criteria for each of
the domains to be achieved to reach that
level. “Each maturity level description
is homogenous and does not represent
more than one level of maturity.”
I. Non-existent/ Undeveloped
II. Early stages of development
III. Good Information Management
Practices
IV. Advanced Practices
V. Industry Best Practices
The framework does not describe any
confirmatory testing requirements to
indicate that the organisation is on the
correct path.
The framework advocates an
The criteria for assessment is grouped
incremental phased approach to check
into 3 major control areas (i.e.)
the effectiveness of the progress of the
management controls (ii.) operational
needed security controls. The 5 levels
controls (iii.) technical controls.
Within these control areas there are 17 are:
I. Control objective documented in a
individual topics covering security
issues ranging from Risk Management security policy
II. Security controls documented as
to Personnel Security to Audit trails.
procedures
This comprehensive framework while
primarily aimed at government agencies III. Procedures have been implemented
IV. Procedures and security controls
(US) is applicable to other private
are tested and reviewed
organisations. For each criteria, the
V. Procedures and security controls
relevant reference to the source is
are fully integrated into a
provided (e.g. Act or other NIST
comprehensive program.
guideline)
For each claim (answer) to a question,
there is a requirement for evidence in
the form of references, which need to
be detailed out in the Comments field.
Additionally, the questionnaire contains
a field that can be checked when a riskbased decision has been made to either
reduce or enhance a security control.
The model describes a security
The framework provides for assurance
engineering maturity model similar to
through the direct requirements of two
the Capability Maturity Models
process areas viz. PA-6 and PA-11.
developed by the Software Engineering These process areas focus on defining
Institute (SEI). The model describes 11 the security objectives, evidence
process areas directly related to the
requirements and providing the
security engineering discipline. These
argument that the security needs are
are grouped into 3 major areas – Risk,
satisfied.
Engineering and Assurance. They are:
PA01 Administer Security Controls (E) The second source of assurance is the
PA02 Assess Impact (R)
improvement model consisting of the
PA03 Assess Security Risk (R)
different capability levels for the
PA04 Assess Threat (R)
organisation to achieve. These are:
PA05 Assess Vulnerability (R)
Level 1: Performed Informally
PA06 Build Assurance Argument (A)
Level 2: Planned & Tracked
PA07 Coordinate Security (E)
Level 3: Well Defined
PA08 Monitor Security Posture (E)
Level 4: Qualitatively Controlled
PA09 Provide Security Input (E)
Level 5: Continuously Improving
PA10 Specify Security Needs (E)
Quantitatively Controlled
PA11 Verify and Validate Security (A)
Finally, the model is supplemented
The aim of the model is to focus on the through an ‘Appraisal model’, which is
security engineering process as
a guideline explaining how to collect
compared to suggesting a particular set ‘evidence’ through a systematic
of practices and security related
approach to audit the security function
controls.
of an organisation using the SSE-CMM
model.
While these 34 control objectives cover CobiT is a comprehensive tool designed
the entire domain of IT, for the purpose specifically for IT Governance that ‘
of this comparison, the following
that helps in understanding and
control objectives directly related to IT managing the risks and benefits
Security are identified as follows:
associated with information and related
PO2 Define the Information
IT.’
Architecture
PO4 Define the IT Organisation and
In addition, corresponding to each of
Relationships
the 34 high-level control objectives is
PO6 Communicate Management Aims an Audit Guideline to enable the review
and Direction
of IT processes against COBIT’s 318
PO8 Ensure Compliance with External recommended detailed control
Requirements
objectives to provide management

The 9 process domains directly
applicable to IT Security (out of 30) are
identified below:
• Principles, Policies & Standards
Note: The model is primarily • Roles and responsibilities
about Information
• User awareness
Management. For this
• User Training & User Support
discussion, only the related
• Information Quality
infosec domains are
• Security
considered.
• Risk Management
• Business Continuity
• Compliance

Information
Management Maturity
Model
(KPMG)

FITSAF
(US Federal IT Security
Assessment
Framework: NIST SP
800-26, NIST SP 80051)
Swanson , M (2001),
Security Self-Assessment
Guide for Information
Technology Systems,
NIST Special Publication
800-26, November.

SSE-CMM
(Systems Security
Engineering –
Capability Maturity
Model:
ISO 21827:2002)
SSE-CMM Project
(1999) Systems Security
Engineering Capability
Maturity Model,
Model Description
Document Version 2.0.
1st April 1999.
(www.sse-cmm.org)

COBIT
(Control Objectives for
Information
Technology, IT
Governance Institute)
The Framework consists
of a set of 34 high-level
Control Objectives,
grouped into four
domains: planning and
organisation (PO),
acquisition and

NO metrics are defined to
substantiate the maturity level
assessment.

KPMG Consulting LP (2002)
Information Management
Maturity Model: Draft D,
National Archives of Canada,
20th August.

Metrics are defined by the set of
criteria for each of the different
levels. While the actual metrics
concentrate mainly on the
comparison of control procedures
and how well it is implemented
and performing – the framework
provides for organisations to
quickly understand where their
current status and where they need
to improve.
The framework further stresses on
the importance of metrics and
rigorous testing in the latter levels.
Further guidance on defining the
metrics, its use and application to
the framework have been
discussed exhaustively in the
latest NIST publication SP 80051.

The model formally prescribes
measurement only at level 4, as
according to the document ‘
Although it is essential to begin
collecting and using basic project
measures early, measurement and
use of data is not expected
organisation wide until the higher
levels have been achieved’.
Level 4, “Quantitatively
Controlled,” focuses on
measurements being tied to the
business goals of the organisation.
While the guideline, emphasises
on the need of metrics, it does not
provide specific guidance on the
definition of metrics, how the
process is to be analysed through
measurements etc. The model
acknowledges that this area will
be dealt in detail through the
Metrics working group.

Along with Maturity models, the
Management Guidelines describe
performance indicators for each of
processes in the form of Critical
Success Factors, which define the
most important managementoriented implementation
guidelines to achieve control over
and within its IT processes; Key
Goal Indicators, which define
measures that tell management—
after the fact—whether an IT
process has achieved its business
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implementation (AI),
delivery and support
(DS), and monitoring
(M).
COBIT (2000) Control
Objectives for
Information Technology,
3rd Edition, ISACF and
ITGI

PO9 Assess Risks
AI2 Acquire and Maintain Application
Software
AI3 Acquire and Maintain Technology
Infrastructure
AI4 Develop and Maintain Procedures
DS4 Ensure Continuous Service
DS5 Ensure Systems Security
DS7 Educate and Train Users
DS10 Manage Problems and Incidents
DS11 Manage Data
DS12 Manage Facilities
DS13 Manage Operations
M1 Monitor the Processes
M2 Assess Internal Control Adequacy
M3 Obtain Independent Assurance

assurance and/or advice for
improvement.

requirements; and Key
Performance Indicators, which are
lead indicators that define
Cobit’s maturity model framework is
measures of how well the IT
described in its Management
process is performing in enabling
Guidelines, which provide management the goal to be reached.
direction for getting the enterprise’s
information and related processes under Apart from the Management
control, for monitoring achievement of Guidelines, which describe in
organisational goals, for monitoring
detail the metrics relevant to the
performance within each IT process and different IT processes, CobiT also
for benchmarking organisational
provides a Implementation Tool
achievement. The incremental scale is
Set which among others features
defined as follows:
consists of two fundamental and
0 Non-Existent
useful tools for getting
1 Initial
management’s attention & raising
2 Repeatable
management’s awareness:
3 Defined
• IT Governance Self-Assessment
4 Managed
• Management’s IT Concerns
5 Optimised
Diagnostic
According to the COBIT guidelines
‘Maturity Models management can map
where the organisation is today, where
it stands in relation to the best-in-class
in its industry and to international
standards and where the organisation
wants to be.’

These tools assist in analysing,
understanding and communicating
an organisation’s IT control
environment and the relevant IT
control issues. These tools help in
capturing the management’s view
of – the level of importance of the
control/process area, performance
level of the controls for the
different processes and the risk
rating of the different IT
processes.
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